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periodic reviews of the need for surrogate management seem warranted. 
Certainly, the standard for restoration of rights ought to be no more rigorous 
or more diflicult than those for initial appointment of a surrogate. 
Additionally, a provision allowing the prospective designation of a 
conservator or guardian by a person anticipating later surrogate management 
of his property seems to preserve at least a medium of his individual autonomy 
and seems desirable. 
Irres pecti ve of how h e  was designated, the prospect of a surrogate 
manager's conflict of interests with his ward should be recognized by the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the ward when major decisions 
affecting the finances of both the conservator/guardian and ward must be 
made. It is probably not practicable to provide for such appointment in all 
ca�cs but the appointing court should be charged with identifying transactions 
requiring it and there should be at least a periodic appointment to represent 
the ward when the surrogate manager accounts to the court. Of course, the 
nced for an additional appointment would be eliminated entirely if the 
conservator/guardian had no direct financial interest in the estate. 
THE AGED PERSON'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
George J. Alexander** 
The evolution of treatment of the aged by the state insofar as the 
management of their property is concerned is extremely instructive. One thing 
that quickly becomes evident in the review of historical development is that; 
the state has not bascially altered its intervention in the right of self-manage­
ment of the aged but it has very basically changed its description of the process. 
Briel1y to review what was stated at greater length in the earlier presen­
tation, the aged who were subjected to such practice were historically de­
prived of management rights in their property under the provision of law 
applicable to lunatics. In some states that is still the law. In many, the lunacy 
provisions remain the appropriate legislation, but persons may be declared 
incompetent on the basis of lunacy (perhaps now mental illness) or age. 
Finally, many states have moved toward a separate incompetency proceeding 
exclusively for the aged. In such proceedings, the determinative issue is still 
whether the subject of the proceeding is competent to function adequately in 
the disposition of his property but the statutes carefully a void any link with 
this kind of competence and insanity. Even the surrogate managers of 
property lose their titles as guardians and become instead conservators. 
** Prol"ssor of Law and Director of Program Development. Syracuse University. College 
of Law. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Syracuse L. Rev.  164 1969-1970
164 SYRACUSE LA W REVIEW 
Inherent in this semantic juggling is the recognition of the often 
devastating impact of labelling persons insane. Quite aside from the 
stigmatizing effect of such a label and its consequent dehumanizing of the 
person labelled, the characterization tends to carry with it certain inevitable 
consequences wholly unrelated to the goals of surrogate management of the 
property of the aged, the most horrendous of which is institutionalization. 
These are matters on which I have previously commented176 and on which the 
literature is extensive.177 It should suffice to note with relief the movement 
away from the use of the concept of mental illness in providing surrogate 
managers for the aged. 
One should also note that the insanity test when it was in vogue appeared 
to impose no significant legal barriers to the process. Although the test was 
mental incompetence in the insanity sense, the testimony in the cases appears 
to have been largely the same testimony that is now admitted on the issue of 
functional competence. Primarily, the question still is how bizarre was the 
behavior of the person in question? Whether described in medical jargon or 
in lay language, judgment about behavior was and is the central test. One 
should not be surprised. Precisely the same thing happens in criminal law. The 
insanity of a defendant is  relevant to his responsibility. His functional 
competence to assist in his defense is relevant to his triability. If one compares 
the testimony introduced on responsibility with the testimony introduced on 
competence to stand trial, he will find the same similarity that is to be found 
in testimony concerning the need for conservator and that relating to a 
guardian. The reason, of course, is that whatever utility medical concepts may 
have in the treatment of patients, as used in the legal context, mental illness 
is merely a conclusion design�d to support a result. If one wishes to exculpate 
a criminal defendant he is mentally ill. If one wishes to convict him, he is sane. 
Similarly, if one wishes to deprive an aged person of the right to manage his 
property, he is mentally ill (if that is the test), otherwise, he is sane. 
Unfortunately, mental illness because it is described in medical terms is 
176. Alexander and Szasz, Mental lllness as an Excuse for CMl Wrongs. 43 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 24 (1967). 
177. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYCHIATRY (1963); T. SZASZ. PsYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 
(1965); Morris, Habeas Corpus and the Confinement of the Mentally Disordered in New YorL 
the Right to the Writ. 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 27 (1968). Harris, Mental lllness. Due Process and 
Lawyers. 55 A.B.A.J. 65 (1969). Allen, Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated 
in Prison. 32 FED. PROB. 22 (1968). Tao, Civil Commitment of the Mentally II in the District 
of Columbia. 13 How. L.J. 303 (1967). Civil Restraint. Mental Illness. and the Right to 
Treatment. 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). Swartz, Compulsory Legal Measures and th,' Concept of 
lllness. 19 S.c.L. REV. 372 (1967). InvoluntaT\' Commitment o( the Mentalll" II in Pennsril'ania. 
5 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 487 (1967). Massachusetts Commitment and Hospitalization Laws (or 
the Mentally lll: Analysis and Proposals for Change. 2 PORTIA L.J. 19 (1966). Plaut 8< Holland. 
Recognition and Handling of Emotional Problems and Mental lllness by the Attorney. \3 PRAC. 
LAW. 69 (1967). Release Procedure under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Act of 1966.5 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 496 (1967). 
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often not recognized as a means to an end and is erroneously perceived in its 
legal context to be subject to scientific verification. Consequently, triers of fact 
tend to be somewhat mesmerized by the testimony of experts with medical 
training. 17K In the worst cases, they may decide incorrectly as to whether a 
surrogate manager is appropriate because they weigh the medical reliability 
of those before them. In the best cases they are subjected to a significant 
amount of irrelevant information in an effort to decide a fairly straight 
forward question. One should, consequently, applaud the movement of the law 
toward a more precise inquiry into the ability of a person to function and 
away from broader notions relating to the state of his supposed mental health. 
The next important inquiry should follow fairly naturally from the 
resolution above described. Implicit in the notion that the standard for state 
intervention for purposes of surrogate management should have a precision 
not reached by the broad mental illness standard is a recognition that this kind 
of intervention is a bask: deprivation of a right cherished in a free society: the 
right of an individual to self determination. It is important to recognize that 
however benevolent the intention of those who would seek to substitute other 
decision makers for the aged, persons deprived of the right to decide for 
themsel ves will ha ve lost the fairly basic attri bute of ci tizenship.179 
Consequently, it seems more appropriate to view the question of how the law 
should intervene not as a question of maximizing benefit to the potential ward 
but of reducing to a minimum the deprivation of that person's rights. From 
this perspective, one might better ask in whose interest is a surrogate manager 
of property appointed? 
There is one sense in which the notion that the surrogate is imposed on 
an individual solely in his own interests is probably sound. It is doubtless true 
that courts could find property managers for most people who, because of 
su perior experience and skill, would better manage the property than their 
wards. This is merely a specific application of the fact that there are usually 
people of greater skill and capacity than any given person. Without even 
considering whether the legal process is perfect enough to substitute a better 
decision maker in most cases, about which we could have some doubt, it is 
easy to reject the notion of benefit to a person occasioned by providing such 
paternalistic oversight. A person may, of course, always voluntarily obtain a 
skilled manager for his property; if one is involuntarily imposed on him one 
should be skeptical of the benefit of such appointment to the potential ward. 
Especially in the case of the aged, one can reject the facile answer often 
given in other cases that a surrogate can preserve property which his ward will 
later be able to use. To the extent that conditions of the aged are likely to be 
the result of general deterioration of mental processes, it seems unlikely that 
178. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: a Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 
29 (Feb.-Mar. 1968). 
179. Alexander and Szasz, supra note 176, at 28. 
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the property management function will often revert to the ward. Although his 
wealth may increase, unless he retains the power to spend his money to 
maximize his own enjoyment, the ward's affluence would hardly seem likely 
to be perceived by him as a benefit. It is, of course, possible that a condition 
requiring substitute management is temporary and that the ward will be able 
to benefit from an intervention which prevents the dissipation of property 
which later he could enjoy. At this point, the information available to the 
study group does not indicate what proportion of those enmeshed in surrogate 
management have a reasonable expectation of again becoming autonomous. 
The question should, obviously, be explored. 
Without empirical data, we can only note that the process described deals 
with people who by definition are mentally debilitated; no reason exists to 
assume that such people as a class are any more indifferent to proper 
maintenance of their wealth than the general population. Presumably, those 
who need surrogate managers will in many cases voluntarily obtain them. 
Also, the coupling of management operations and decision-making in the 
hands of the surrogate manager may be an unnecessarily broad interference 
with the rights of the ward. As many of the aged suffer merely from memory 
loss and unfamiliarity with legal processes without having lost their judgment 
concerning their personal goals. whatever "judgment" might mean in this 
context, a provision allowing a surrogate to seize decision-making authority 
appears to be an overreaction to the problem. As an alternative, to guardians 
or conservators, the law should permit courts to appoint a new category of 
agents called, perhaps, legal assistants. 
A legal assistant would be responsible for reviewing with his charge all 
major financial transactions which the charge seeks to undertake. He would 
remind him of prior obligations, legal restrictions and other complications to 
be anticipated but would be expressly denied the right to substitute his own 
decision for that of his charge. In effect, he would provide a service that is 
directly responsive to a weak memory and a lack of orientation to the legal 
framework of commerce without removing the essential right to property 
disposition from the aged person. 
While the mechanics for t his proposed relationship are beyond the 
purpose of this brief comment the following notions may flesh out the essential 
idea sufficiently for further study. The law might provide for the void ability 
of all major contractual and property transactions made after the designation 
of a legal ass·istant unless the agreements were made with both the legal 
assistant and his charge or countersigned by the legal assistant. Minor 
transactions, such as purchases of necessities, should probably be exempted so 
as not to complicate unnecessarily the every day functioning of the charge. 
The legal assistant should be obliged fully to explain the implications of a 
proposed transaction to his charge but, equally explicitly, be required to 
authorize any transaction proposed when his charge has arrived at an 
informed judgment as to its merits. By such an agency the state could 
satisfy itself that debilitated persons would not fall victim to sharp practices by 
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others without depriving the person of the reason for the protection: the 
preservation of his legitimate use of his own wealth. 
The availability of these two alternatives to surrogate management, 
neither of which requires depriving a person of the ability to make use of his 
own property, would seem in most cases adequate to deal with the problem 
from the standpoint of the interests solely of the ward. Obviously, however, 
the ward is not the only person concerned in the maintenance of his wealth. 
Those who are potential beneficiaries of the ward's affluence take a natural 
interest in its waste; the state has an interest in preventing its citizens from 
so reducing their financial integrity as to become public charges. What is 
important about these interests is that they are interests adverse to the interests 
of the ward. The present process, with its focus on benefit to the ward, 
inadequately and inarticulately deal with such interests. In consequence, 
beneficiaries find themst:-!ves in the cynical position of being forced to plead 
in court for surrogate management premised on benefit to the object of the 
proceeding rather than, ,::andidly, benefit to themselves. I shall review shortly 
a number of illustrations of such suits. Unfortunately, when the underlying 
self interest of the petitioner is probed he appears in a very bad light in such 
court proceedings. Equally unfortunately, when this issue is not explored, 
potential beneficiaries may be awarded an interest in the ward's property 
which the court would find untenable were it determined from the perspective 
of protecting the beneficiaries' interest rather than the ward's. 
A better procedure, it would appear to me, would be to attempt 
legislatively to identify legitimate interests of others and to protect them 
expressly in law rather than to p rotect them circuitously through 
incompetency proceedings. The same apparently bizarre spending habits of a 
potential ward would seem much more objectionable where they divert funds 
from a destitute wife than when' they represent merely the extravagence of a 
person who has decided in old age to become self-indulgent at the expense only 
of distant relatives who might otherwise stand to inherit on his demise. 
The law has already established fairly viable procedures for the protection 
of its OWl! interest in pre-venting citizens from becoming wards of the state.I�O 
It has also addressed itself quite concretely to the requirement of support of 
a wife or an ex-wi few and, at least in minority, of a child, legitimate or not.182 
Parents, also, may be entitled to a modicum of financial support at least when 
without such support their indigence threatens public coffers.l83 Creditors have 
180. Se , e.g .. N.Y. 00\1. REL. LAW § 32(4,5) (McKinney (964); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
� 415 (McKinney Supp. (968). 
181. SI'I!. e.g., N.Y. DO�I. REL. LAW § 32(1) (McKinney (964); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 412 
(McKinney (963). 
182. SI!I!. I!.g .. N.Y. 00\1. REL. LAW §§ 30-43 (Uniform Support of Dependents Law) 
(McKinney (964); N. Y. FA�I. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney Supp. (969). 
183. See . ... g .• N.V. FA�1. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney Supp. (969). 
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a right to collect their debts.l� It would seem useful now to attempt to identify 
others whose financial expectations should also be expressly recognized by 
law. Admittedly, I have not attempted to delimit the group. Perhaps it is 
already large enough. The question appears to be worthy of further 
consideration. 
Once society has appropriately identified those who may legitimately 
expect financial support from a given person, it would seem a salutary change 
in the focus of present law to allow a direct action by such persons in 
pursuance of their interests in preference to an incompetency proceeding 
addressed against the ward. Of what moment is the mental acuity of a wealthy 
defendant if he in fact squanders funds which society has decided should first 
meet his obligations to those near to him? Indeed, a squandering of money 
legitimately owed to creditors or spouses or others would seem morally far 
more reprehensible when the squanderer is a person fully capable of more 
circumspect management. On the other hand, the self-indulgence of a person 
on whom no one legitimately depends, however abhorrent to our Calvinist 
tradition, ought not to occasion state intervention. 
Recasting the problem of surrogate management in adversary terms leads 
to one other important result. The self-interest of the surrogate manager 
becomes a problem of moment. At present, the law prefers near relatives to 
strangers as surrogate managers. Yet near relatives are most likely to have 
their own financial expectations in their ward's estate and thus to be driven 
by duty to their ward and self-interest in opposite directions. Any authorized 
expenditure reduces their own potential inheritance. 
While courts can supervise surr ogate relationships with a view to 
preventing decisions adverse to the ward's interests, the time expenditure 
required makes it unlikely that they will adequately accomplish such a 
demanding task. It would seem better to eliminate the conflict of interests. Yet 
near relatives are often the only available surrogates and sometimes (but not 
always) the most sympathetic ones. 
One solution to the problem would be to require courts to attempt to 
obtain professional managers as surrogates in all cases. In the event the estate 
is sizable, the task should not be difficult. (In the event that the estate is too 
small to attract professional management, the temptation to near relatives is 
likely also less pronounced.) If it is determined that professional management 
is available, a court should give near relatives the option of professional 
management or their own appointment, conditioning the appointment of the 
surrogate on an express renunciation of any financial benefit from the ward, 
in his life or on his death, other than the fee for guardianship/conservatorship. 
If professional management is unavailable, no such renunciation should be 
required. Of course, the ward's previously expressed wishes, if legally compe-
184. See. e.g . . N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106 (McKinney 1964). 
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tent, ought to prevail over the plan described. The plan is designed to meet 
what will likely remain the great majority of cases in which the ward has not 
previously expressed himself on the subject. 
While the discussion so far has related specifically to problems of the 
aged it seems appropriate to note that the notions above expressed are 
applicable not only to aged citizens but equally to all citizens threatened by 
state intervention in their property management. Others accused of the 
"mental illness" which was once the hallmark of proceedings against the aged 
would seem equally entitled to remain in possession of their rights of property 
disposition so long as they do not deprive others legitimately entitled in the 
pr ocess. It again seems to make little difference whether the alleged 
squandering of funds results from indulgence in old age or the desire more 
fully to live in one's fantasy life. It will, of course, be asserted that it is more 
likely in cases of mental illness than of mere aging that t he period of 
incompetence is a temporary one and that the property could be preserved for 
later use by the incompetent. I am not prepared adequately to refute the 
accuracy of such an observation; an empirical study would seem warranted. 
The length of present terms of incarceration of persons committed for mental 
illness suggests, however, that the notion of "speedy cure" of "mental 
illness," whatever that might mean, is a distant one. Also, the implicit 
assumption that there is a legally relevant content to the notion of mental 
illness is again called into question though I will not belabor that point here. 
Instead, I should like to illustrate prior use of "mental il lness" as a 
determinant of incompetence to manage property to demonstrate the 
significance of recasting the problem in adversary terms and abandoning the 
euphemistic notion of benefit to the ward. 
Some of the curious conflict of interest of the type discussed can be found 
in Denner v. Beyer.l'6S The alleged incompetent's sister brought the proceedings 
to have herself appointed guardian and succeeded in obtaining that 
appointment in a trial court. In the ward's appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, it turned out that her interests were substantially adverse to 
those of her guardian. The ward was a diabetic and partially blind widow of 
sixty years. She had inherited approximately twenty-two thousand dollars 
from her husband and had given plaintiff a power of attorney over her money 
in return for a promise to provide a home for her for life. According to the 
ward, shortly thereafter, her guardian renigged on the obligations of care and 
attempted to place her in homes in various parts of Pennsylvania. The ward's 
response was to revoke her will, removing her guardian as chief beneficiary 
and revoking the power of attorney. At this point, the guardian countered by 
bringing an incompetency proceeding. By the success in the trial court, the 
guardian obtained not only a continuation of her power of attorney, now 
185. 352 Pa. 386,42 A.2d 747 (1945). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Syracuse L. Rev.  170 1969-1970
170 SYRACUSE LA W REVIEW 
judicially sanctioned, but also well advanced her litigation posture on probate 
of the will, being able to claim that the revocation was a product of a diseased 
mind. If anything, the appellate court appears to be guilty of understatement 
when it notes:186 "The record gives the impression that the motive for the 
petition was not so much to conserve the respondent's property as to channel 
its inheritance to the next of kin. "181 
Similarly, in Lomax v. Washam,I�8 a daughter obtained guardianship 
when her father, after an unsuccessful period of living with her, used his 
resources to finance a home for himself with strangers. Especially as those 
strangers began to become beneficiaries of his limited estate, his daughter 
sought judicial intervention and, as in the prior case, found the trial court 
quite willing. The appellate court reversed, blocking her plans. Also, in 
Malnick's Estate,189 the Supreme Court of Nebraska was forced to reverse an 
appointment of a guardian which appeared to have been premised primarily 
on the ward's inability to account for the disposition of a sum of $5,400 which 
she had received in a one year period. The court noted that the daughter who 
would obtain guardianship was a joint tenant in the ward's property, bonds, 
checking accounts, and safe deposit box and thought her an inappropriate 
guardian. 
The fact that, in each case, the guardianship was dissolved on final appeal 
should not be understood as an indication that such cases are resolved 
satisfactorily in the present system. Research of the cases of necessity focused 
on data available in reported decisions. Only in those in which an appellate 
court was perceptive enough to look through the discussion on mental illness 
or functional incompetence (and thus often reversed the decision below), could 
one obtain a sense of the facts. Doubtless, the appellate cases mentioned are 
illustrative of many others in which the trial court prevailed. Even were one 
more sanguine about court decision on appellate review, the substantial costs 
of appeal in addition to trial would make this an inappropriate method of 
safeguarding wards. 
The problem can, of course, be more complicated than a simple effort 
by beneficiaries to insure their inheritance. The proceeding may turn out to 
by an effort by some of the beneficiaries to improve their position vis-a-vis 
other beneficiaries. Thus, in Lamont's Estate,19D the trial and appellate courts 
both agreed that lapses in memory on the part of the ward would justify the 
appointment of a guardianship. Mrs. Lamont had obvious difficulty with her 
memory. She had deeded all of her land to one son but later asserted that she 
186. !d. at _, 42 A.2d at 748. 
187. See also Bryden'� Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 61 A. 250 (1905); Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 
357,58 A. 665 (1904). 
188. 364 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1961). 
189. 180 Neb. 748, 145 N.W.2d 339 (1966). 
190. 95 Utah 219, 79 P.2d 649 (1938). 
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would prefer him not to have it. She also had a number of other obvious 
memory losses. Among other things, she had apparently signed a document 
authorizing the appointment of a guardian which she later repudiated. She 
could not recall the number of acres in her farm or how many cows she 
owned. More central than a concern for the effect of her memory on the 
disposition of her property, however, appeared to be the concern of the other 
children that the son who had benefited from her previous generosity was 
obtaining an undue advantage over them. The guardianship approved in both 
the trial and appellate courts presumably took care of their interests. 
In O/son v. Olson,'�1 the main dispute appears to have been between the 
aard's second wife and his children. The ward was a man of limited education 
(less than one year of formal education). Although penniless when he married 
his first wife, he apparently amassed a substantial sum during his lifetime. He 
lost most, but not all of it, during the depression by loaning large sums to 
his friends. About twenty-three thousand dollars was lost in this fashion. After 
the death of his tirst wife he remarried in 1939. His life with his second wife 
was marked by trouble and in the process the ward's funds were further 
depleted. When the second wife died the ward's children arranged for his care 
with a nephew, apparently not wanting to care for him themselves. The ward 
agreed to pay the nephew five thousand dollars for the care of him for the 
rest of his life. This left seven thousand dollars of his funds in the bank. On 
the urging of his nephew's wife, that the money be put in a bank, he consented 
only to tind that she deposited it in her own name. At this point, plaintiffs 
children reappeared. They offered help and took their father to an attorney. 
Instead of legal proceedings to recover his seven thousand dollars, however, 
the proceedings initiated were those appropriate to having him declared 
incompetent. On later review the Supreme Court of Iowa returned him to 
competence. 
The most common functional defect attributed to alleged incompetence 
in the cases is memory loss. Memory loss was central to the decision to allow 
guardianship in Lamont's Estate.192 The ward's forgetfulness in Schulmeyer's 
Guardianship v. McAllister,193 and most particularly his inability to recall his 
recent financial transactions, led to the court's approval of his guardianship. 
Similarly in Blochowitz Guardianshipl94 the ward's confusion as to the current 
status of various pieces of property featured prominently in her being declared 
incompetent. On the other hand, in the Denner case discussed previously and 
Michelson's Guardianshipl95 and Nelson's Guardianshipl96 the courts refused 
191. 242 Iowa 192,46 N.W.2d 1 (1951). 
192. Supra note 190. 
193. 171 Cal. 340,153 P. 233 (1915). 
194. 135 Neb. 163,280 N.W. 438 (1938). 
195. 8 Wash. 2d 327, III P.2d 1011 (1941). 
196. 12 Wash. 2d 382,121 P.2d 968 (1942). 
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to consider mere memory impairment a sufficient reason for legitimating 
guardianship. The dilemma, in these cases, results from the court's lack of 
alternatives. They could either declare incompetency or refuse to declare it. 
Neither alternative well matched the needs of the case. The proposal, in this 
paper, for the appointment of a legal assistant would appear to provide a more 
appropriate remedy in such cases and to relieve the courts of the dilemma. 
Finally, a comparison of two cases of alleged incompetents who exhibited 
bizarre behavior suggests the importance of viewing cases from a new 
perspective. In Waite's Guardianship197 the ward was 78. Her second husband 
died when she was 75 leaving her thirty-one thousand dollars. At 76 she 
married her third husband, aged 45, living with him only two months. Her 
divorce cost her four thousand dollars. She spent another eight thousand 
dollars on purchasing a ranch which she had always wanted to own and paid 
$850 to stock it with cattle. Having acquired it, she gave half interest in the 
ranch and its income to a man in return for his management of it and his 
serving her as chauffeur. By the time of the incompetency hearing she had 
tired of the ranch and wanted to be rid of it. 
In Smith v. Smith198 the alleged incompetent was 77 years old and worth 
about one hundred thousand dollars. Much of his accumulated wealth was 
apparently due to the hard effort of his wife who died of malnutrition three 
years before the proceedings in question. During her life his wife had been 
required to live in a small portion of her husband's hotel on a narrow cot 
although there were many unoccupied bedrooms in the hotel. Her diet 
consisted of sandwiches, crackers and canned goods despite their wealth and 
this undoubtedly led to the malnutrition of which the wife died. The husband, 
after his wife's demise, often frequented local taverns, made a present of 
eighteen thousand dollars in bonds to a married woman (although he later 
forgot what had happened to the money). He followed that gift with a gift of 
a three thousand dollar car. She in turn cared for the widower. Finally, when 
the widower published a public notice of his intention to sell all of his real 
property, his only child brought suit to have him declared incompetent. 
The courts decided the cases differently. Although guardianship had 
resulted in the trial court, the Supreme Court of California in Waite's 
Guardianship199 invalidated it, characterizing the ward's conduct as merely 
poor business judgment. On the other hand, in Smith v. Smith20 the Supreme 
Court of Alabama affirmed the appointment of a guardian. In both courts, 
the self-indulgent conduct of the alleged incompetent was the sole focal issue. 
In neither did the court address itself to the question of the deprivation of 
others by the squandering of funds. Yet, clearly, that is what both cases were 
197. 14 Cal. 2d 727,97 P.2d238 (1939). 
198. 254 Ala. 404, 48 So. 2d 546 (1950). 
199. Supra note 197. 
200. Supra note 198. 
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primarily about. In both the aged had used their funds to gratify their 
immediate desires. At the time of hearing, children of both stood to lose 
substantial value in their inheritance expectancy. Yet, neither court inquired 
into their needs or the legitimacy of their claims on their parents' estate. It 
may well be, in the circumstances, that both parents were, quite rationally, 
squandering their funds in recognition of the fact that they would not likely 
be able to enjoy them much longer. If one examines both cases from the 
standpoint of interests adverse to the ward's, there is little reason, on the facts 
developed, for distinguishing between the children of the two alleged 
incompetents in question. The interest of the wife it} Smith v. Smith.201 
however, had she been alive at the time when proceedings were begun, would 
be another matter. Her husband's self-indulgence with his substantial wealth 
would be most objectionable when contrasted to her Cinderella-like existence. 
One could easily justify an intervention in her husband's financial schemes on 
her behalf while, on the basis of the same conduct, one might have greater 
doubt about his child and should probably reject a claim based on familial 
ties by anyone more distantly related. 
It is rather curious that in a legal system which ordinarily is very 
cognizant of checks and balances, persons are allowed the weapon of 
incompetency in promoting self-interest. Elemental notions of conflicts of 
interests suggest that a revision of the underlying theory is long overdue. 
Where intervention is required for any reason it seems extremely important 
to assure that if a surrogate be appointed he be as free of the pressures of 
avarice as the system will allow. It should be clear that his obligation is to 
maximize the benefit to the ward and not of the ward's heirs.202 At the same 
ti me, the system should be recast so as to reduce the occasions for the 
appointment of a surrogate at all. 
201. /d. 
202. S"" Jones v. Lamoourn. 159 Colo. 246.411 P.2d II (1966). 
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